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Fraud and Poverty:  
Exploring Ex Ante Victim Data 
 
Abstract 
Fraud studies rely on potentially underreported/misreported victim data in developed 
countries, virtually ignoring developing countries. This paper proposes using ex ante 
victim data, to be collected before attempted victims become aware of the fraudulence, 
and examines recruitment fraud, which is tightly linked with poverty. In rural Fiji, almost 
one quarter of households were defrauded of application fees for labor migration. The 
bigger problem is indirect costs: Controlling for victim endogeneity reveals that 
households’ false expectations about international remittances led to a significant 
reduction in the domestic private transfers victims received. The analysis sharply 
identifies who was victimized and why/why not. 
  
Key Words: Recruitment fraud; Poverty; Ex ante victim data; Labor migration; Private 
transfers; Fiji 
JEL Codes: K42, O12.  
 
I.  Introduction 
Fraud – “deceit or intentional misrepresentation of fact with the intent of 
unlawfully depriving a person of his or her property rights” (Rush 1986, p. 103) – is a 
major crime in human society. This paper addresses two fundamental lacunae in fraud 
studies. The first lacuna, which is empirical, is that the literature virtually ignores 
developing countries, especially poor populations. Fraud in developed countries is an 
enormous problem. Anderson (1999) estimates the total annual fraud losses (excluding 
costs for preventing and responding to fraud) in the United States to be about $440 billion. 
In a U.S. national survey in 1991, Titus, Heinzelmann, and Boyle (1995) find that 31% of 
respondents had experienced victimization or attempted victimization of consumer fraud 
in the preceding year, and 15% of the total sample suffered successful victimizations, 
with an average loss of $216, suggesting over $40 billion annual losses among Americans 





In contrast, fraud in developing countries has received very limited attention and most 
extant crime and victim studies focus on violent and property crimes.
1 Some Living 
Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) of the World Bank, for example, cover crime 
victimization, but not fraud victimization.
2
What underlies the virtual ignorance of fraud among the poor is a common 
perception that fraud is a problem of the wealthy: Those with limited incomes and assets 




This paper examines recruitment fraud in developing countries.
 I argue that crime and development studies miss a potentially huge problem 
of fraud, which is directly linked with poverty. First, the poor in developing countries are 
more vulnerable to fraud in productive activities than consumer fraud, because they are 
willing to pay for better earning opportunities. Second, victims can suffer from much 
more than defrauded money (direct costs), because with false expectations about earnings 
induced by the fraud, people alter their behaviors in adverse ways (indirect costs, or 
externalities). Fraud in productive activities may significantly undermine peoples’ risk 
attitudes, investments, trust, and informal institutions; fraud may be a hidden cause of 
poverty traps, as theorized by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2005) for crime in general 
(see also Lloyd-Ellis and Marceau 2003).  
4
                                                 
1 Since Becker’s (1968) pioneering work, there has been a surge of economic studies on 
crime, victimization, and punishment. Although most extant studies focus on urban crime 
in both developed and developing countries (e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999), some 
empirical works highlight crime in rural developing areas (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten 
2006; Miguel 2005). This paper adds to the growing literature on poverty and crime in 
rural developing areas.  
 Although 
international labor migration and remittances play important roles in many developing 
2 In contrast, significant attention has been given to corruption – “acts in which the power 
of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the 
game” (Jain 2001, p.73). Seligson (2006) examines household-level corruption 
victimization.  
3 In developed countries, policing agencies, news media, and survey firms also give much 
less attention to frauds against poor consumers than those against businesses and public 
bodies (e.g., Levi and Burrows 2008).  
4 Recruitment fraud is part of employment fraud, involving the scamming of people 
seeking, not performing, employment. Although in-house recruitment can be a fraud, 
recruitment fraud targeting the poor is mostly recruitment agencies’ fraud. In this paper, I 





areas, labor migrants often rely on recruitment agencies with information about and 
market power in foreign job markets and their potential fraud and abuse have been 
frequently noted (World Bank 2006b). All that is known about recruitment agencies’ 
fraud, however, is based on anecdotal evidence and limited case studies.
5 As far as I 
know, there exists no victim survey on recruitment fraud. The International Crime Victim 
Survey (ICVS) of the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention covers 
only consumer fraud. In developed countries, recruitment fraud in out-migration has 
received little attention.
6
The second lacuna in the literature, which is methodological, is that it relies on 
incomplete victim data. A fundamental difference exists between fraud and other crimes: 
When responding to fraud attempts, victims are unaware of the offense. The decisions 
that attempted victims had thought were good later turned out to be bad. This gap 
between expectation and reality not only brings fraud into existence, but also strongly 
shapes attempted victims’ responses to survey questions. It is well known that victims of 
white-collar crimes are reluctant to report the incidents because they feel embarrassed 
(Ennis 1967): Many victims “often are viewed with a mixture of skepticism, suspicion, 
and disbelief, and viewed as unworthy of society’s protection” (Walsh and Schram 1980, 
pp.46-47). Titus, Heinzelmann, and Boyle (1995) find that only one third of self-reported 
consumer-fraud victims report their experiences to the authorities; Mason and Benson 
(1996) show an even smaller rate of reporting (23%). Underreporting of victimization per 
se is also very likely in fraud victim surveys, though this critical problem has not yet been 
systematically addressed. Other information related to fraud victimization also can be 
misreported by respondents who hide the incidents, for coherence. Such 
  
                                                 
5 In their study of Sri Lankan labor migrants to the Middle East in the mid-1980s, Eelens 
and Speckmann (1990, p319) mention the prevalence of fraudulent recruitment agencies: 
“Almost weekly, serious cases of fraud by bogus agents are reported in the local 
newspapers. Frequently, these types of agents promise the prospective migrants foreign 
employment, collect the fees and they disappear. Cases are known in which a single 
fraudulent agent cheated several hundreds would-be migrants. Although the Sri Lanka 
Fraud Bureau has taken action against such malpractices, many poor people are victims 
of these unscrupulous individuals.” Spaan (1994) studies the role of recruitment agencies 
in Indonesian international migration.  
6 For example, recruitment fraud is not listed as a common type of fraud in Levi and 





underreporting/misreporting problems can be significant in any fraud victim surveys that 
collect information about the victimization (reality) after victims and/or the public 
become aware of the fraudulence. Now, imagine a survey for attempted victims 
conducted before they become aware of the fraudulence. As respondents never 
manipulate records to cover up (or exaggerate) the victimization experience before they 
know about it, the survey is free from fraud-induced measurement errors. The distinction 
of ex ante victim data on expectation from ex post victim data on reality is critical for 
fraud (but not for other crimes). This distinction has been ignored in the literature, 
however;
7
The gap between expectation and reality in fraud victimization also strongly 
differentiates its consequences before the fraudulence is noticed (ex ante impacts) from 
those afterward (ex post impacts). Researchers have not yet explored ex ante impacts, 
although they are indispensable to measure indirect costs of fraud victimization. As fraud 
victimization is not an exogenous shock, but a bad decision made by victims, controlling 
for its endogeneity is crucial to identify its true impacts – either ex ante or ex post; victim 
endogeneity, however, has not yet been addressed in the fraud literature.
 all available fraud victim data are ex post victim data.  
8
This paper conducts a first ex ante victim data analysis. Section II offers a 
conceptual framework of fraud victimization, victim data, and victim endogeneity. At 
first glance, collecting ex ante victim data seems infeasible, because researchers and 
professionals cannot tell the fraudulence until victims or the public notice it; moreover, 
such data collection can be morally wrong, because even if such early detection of fraud 
is made, it should be used to prevent the fraud per se. I propose feasible data-collection 
designs. Section III describes my own ex ante victim data on an organized recruitment 
fraud in Fiji. In 2005, a recruitment agency defrauded more than 20,000 individuals of 
 Ex ante victim 
surveys can collect not only reliable information about outcomes, but also instrumental 
variables (IV) needed for identification.   
                                                 
7 Criminologists consider the time gap between the commission of the offence and 
awareness, reporting, and recording as a data problem in fraud statistics (e.g., Levi and 
Burrows 2008).   
8 Some economic works examine broad consequences of crime – other than fraud – and 
victimization by addressing their endogeneity. Crime can have a long-run effect, such as 
child abuse as a source of future crime (Currie and Tekin 2006), and can involve negative 





application fees for labor migration to the Middle East.
9 I conducted a survey about 
people’s job applications, before they had become aware of the offense. Sections IV and 
V, respectively, investigate who applied for the jobs and why/why not. In Section VI, as 
an example of ex ante impacts of fraud victimization, I examine household domestic 
private transfers, which play a central role in kin-based Fijian society (Hann 2006). With 
strong expectations and beliefs about labor migration among potential donors, the 
substitution effect – newly available international remittances reduce domestic private 
transfers – may already be at work.
10
The major findings can be summarized as follows. First, recruitment fraud 
victimization is highly prevalent in rural Fiji. Almost one quarter of households in the 
region were defrauded, with direct costs in a range of monthly per-capita earned income. 
Second, victims suffer much more. The prospective labor migration greatly lowered the 
domestic private transfers victims received. Third, preventing fraud victimization is very 
difficult. Only better domestic employment is shown to be a solution. The last section 
concludes by synthesizing the major findings and discussing promising data collection 
and questions for new fraud study. 
 Because the expected substitution is not realized, all 
reduced private transfers, if any, are indirect costs borne by victims.  
II.  Conceptual framework and fraud-victim data 
A.  Fraud victimization 
Consider one fraudster and one individual. Fraud victimization consists of four 
stages, as depicted in Figure 1 (recruitment fraud is used as an example here, but the 
framework applies to other types of fraud, such as consumer fraud). Stage 1 occurs prior 
to the fraudster’s fraud attempt. Stage 2 begins once the fraudster targets the individual; 
he/she becomes an attempted victim before he/she knows. The individual’s decision 
                                                 
9 Recruitment fraud as a pitfall in international labor migrations is particularly relevant in 
Pacific island states, which are often dependent on them (Bertram 1986; World Bank 
2006a). In contrast with extensive ethnographic studies by anthropologists, systematic 
economic works using micro survey data are very scant in the region. 
10 Following seminal works by Becker (1974), Barro (1974), and Cox (1987), economists 
have extensively studied household private transfers. Numerous studies examine motives 
for migrants’ remittances and their consequences (e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985) (see 
Rapoport and Docquier 2006 for a review). My inquiry is closely related to the crowding-





involves a tradeoff – taking an attractive job offer requires an advance payment. Stage 2, 
during which the attempted victim can make a decision, is usually short, because the 
longer the wait, the higher the risk of the fraudulence being detected. Stage 3 begins once 
the individual’s decision determines his/her expected status; only if he/she takes the 
fraudster’s offer, the status changes to an attractive one (such as employment) and the 
fraudster’s status changes correspondingly – successful or unsuccessful attempt. Stage 4 
begins once the fraudulence is detected;
 11
Ex ante and ex post impacts of fraud victimization are realized in stages 3 and 4, 
respectively. Whether ex ante impacts matter and ex ante victim data at least theoretically 
can be collected strongly depend on stage 3’s duration, which can significantly vary. On 
the one hand, it can be virtually instant (e.g., online consumer fraud); then, ex ante 
impacts are nonexistent and there is virtually no chance to collect ex ante victim data. On 
the other hand, if the fraudulence remains unknown, stage 3’s duration is infinite and thus 
only ex ante impacts matter; however, victimization per se is never noticed (stage 4 does 
not emerge). In practice many frauds are in between these two extremes.
 the individual becomes aware of his/her 
realized status – victim or non-victim. Fraud is sharply distinguished from other crimes 
by this gap between expected and realized status; in other crimes, stages 2 and 3 are 
nonexistent and ex ante impacts/victim data are irrelevant. This gap is also irrelevant for 
the fraudster (the shift to stage 4 alters risk of being captured though).  
12
B.  Ex post vs. ex ante victim data 
    
Surveys that collect crime-victim data are either victim surveys or household 
surveys with a victimization module. They have distinct potential advantages in 
collecting ex post fraud-victim data in stage 4; although a victim survey on one specific 
fraud (i.e., no fraud heterogeneity) enables a sharp identification of determinants of fraud 
victimization,
13
                                                 
11 In practice, the transition from stage 3 to stage 4 may be gradual as the attempted 
victim’s information and/or suspicion grows. The timing of transition also can vary 
among attempted victims and between them and others (e.g., news media).   
 a household survey can capture its broad impacts.   
12 Although ex ante impacts may be persistent in stage 4, it is very difficult to distinguish 
them from ex post impacts, because both are caused by the same decision.  
13 Although a small number of victims of a specific crime often make statistical analysis 
infeasible, a particular fraud may involve a large number of victims; however, 





The ex ante victim survey to be conducted in stage 3 is totally different from the 
ex post survey; standard questions about victimization do not work, simply because 
respondents have not yet become aware of their realized status. The key is whether any of 
the household survey’s modules other than victimization capture respondents’ expected 
status. The following three designs are possible: 
1)  Passive design: A household survey is accidentally conducted in stage 3, and this is 
noticed only after the survey was completed.  
2)  Proactive design: Researchers or professionals conduct a household survey on 
potential fraud, hoping that it covers stage 3.   
3)  Reactive design: Researchers or professionals who conduct a household survey get 
suspicious about fraudulence by chance, before attempted victims do so (stage 3), and 
they add questions about the potential but concrete fraud.  
Although all these three designs rely heavily on chance (as any natural experiment does), 
they have distinct strengths and weaknesses as follows.  
The passive design in principle can be applied to any standard household survey. 
It depends on pure luck not only to encounter the fraud at the “right” time, but also to 
accidentally capture fraud-related data, along with fraud information that can be matched 
with the survey data (e.g., identification of victims). Although the odds that a particular 
survey satisfies these conditions are negligible, there may exist such surveys somewhere 
in the world. All that is needed is to search accidental data collection among available 
household surveys by using specific widespread frauds as a marker and to pay attention 
to such a possibility in future surveys.  
The proactive survey captures household behaviors corresponding to potential 
frauds, about which only incomplete information is available (e.g., the authorities’). For 
example, in the case where recruitment agencies’ fraud is known to be prevalent, the 
survey can ask questions not only about realized migration (e.g., migrant’s attributes, 
remittances), but also about household efforts to send a migrant laborer, including non-
                                                                                                                                                 
Trahan, Marquart, and Mullings 2005). Large-scale general victim surveys (e.g., ICVS) 
potentially capture not only fraud victims and non-victims, but also individuals on whom 
fraud attempts were not made (not shown in Figure 1) (e.g., Titus, Heinzelmann, and 
Boyle 1995); this is also the case for large-scale household surveys (e.g., LSMS) if a 







Compared to the proactive design, the reactive survey using richer prior 
information about potential fraud has significant advantages: The probability of covering 
stage 3 is much higher, survey questions can be more concrete and focused, and it can be 
applied in any locale (it is a cross-cutting design by definition). The possibility of using a 
reactive design is more restrictive, however, for the following reasons. First, it strongly 
relies on researchers’ and practitioners’ flexibility. It probably fits best in researchers’ 
small-scale surveys with limited institutional constraints. Second, it depends on 
researchers’ strong sensitivity and luck to notice a weak sign of the potential fraud earlier 
than attempted victims do. Third, researchers must be truly unsure of their suspicion; 
otherwise, they instead should report it to the authorities.  
 The proactive design is effective only in fraud-prone locales. With a 
risk of missing stage 3 and fraud-related data, a cross-cutting design for other purposes 
(e.g., realized migration) is recommended.      
C.  Victim endogeneity 
To identify ex ante and ex post impacts of endogenous fraud victimization, 
researchers can use IVs that determine the attempted victim’s decision in stage 2, but do 
not directly influence the outcome of interest in stages 3 and 4, respectively.
15
In practice, some information about frauds and/or fraudsters needs to be collected, 
and tradeoffs exist between ex post and ex ante surveys. On the one hand, in the ex post 
survey, researchers who can identify realized frauds (and maybe also fraudsters) can 
collect detailed, specific data; they need to rely on respondents’ retrospection about stage 
2, however, which might involve considerable misreporting, as discussed above. On the 
 Good 
candidates for IVs include factors that alter the attempted victim’s perception about the 
fraud attempt and/or the benefit-cost calculation in his/her decision making. This is 
especially so for an ex ante impact analysis, because the attempted victim has not yet 
considered such factors as those determining his/her realized status.  
                                                 
14 It is even possible to design a panel survey with many waves with short intervals – to 
be set depending on stage 3’s duration – hopefully covering different victimization stages 
of the same household. Such detailed data are extremely useful to dissect the mechanism 
of fraud victimization. 
15 Alternatively, a natural experiment such that attempted victims’ decisions are 
considered to be almost random with respect to the outcome of interest can be looked for, 





other hand, although such misreporting is not a major concern in the ex ante survey, 
researchers employing the proactive design, with limited information about specific 
frauds, necessarily rely on less focused questions; this problem is smaller in the reactive 
design using richer prior information.  
III. Fijian recruitment fraud and ex ante victim data 
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.K.- and U.S.-based private security 
companies have been seeking personnel for their operations in the Middle East (e.g., 
delivering supplies to U.S. armed forces in Iraq) (MacLellan 2006). Pay is good, but the 
jobs are dangerous. With a large pool of former army personnel, Fiji has been a major 
labor supplier. Even though some casualties had been reported, the Fijian government 
welcomed this movement as a solution for its unemployment. In late 2004 and early 2005, 
a Fijian recruitment agency conducted the largest recruitment drive in the country. All 
healthy males between the ages of 18 and 60 were eligible to apply. According to news 
media, the agency collected US$2 million fees from at least 20,000 applicants.   
In June-September 2005, I conducted a survey among 906 randomly selected 
households in 43 native Fijian villages in Cakaudrove Province, which was extensively 
covered by the agency’s recruitment drive.
16 The sampling design was not affected by job 
applications at all.
17
                                                 
16 Fiji is divided almost evenly between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians. My study focuses 
on native Fijians. The fraudulent recruitment agency is staffed by only native Fijians and 
its recruitment drive in rural areas covered native Fijian villages only on the three largest 
islands in the country – Viti Levu, Vanua Levu, and Taveuni. Cakaudrove Province, 
consisting of part of Vanua Levu, all of Taveuni, and other small islands, significantly 
lags behind the main island Viti Levu, where the state capital, two international airports, 
and most tourism businesses are situated. 
 The survey was designed to collect information about demographics, 
assets, production, income, and transfers (but not consumption). While I was pretesting 
the questionnaires in May 2005, I became aware of the unusual recruitment drive and 
quickly added questions about job applications. I was not very suspicious about potential 
17 There are 5,117 households in 134 native Fijian villages in the province (in the 
population). In each of 16 districts, villages were intentionally chosen to cover distinct 
environmental and economic conditions, before I became aware of the recruitment drive. 
In each village, households were stratified by a smallest kin-group unit (sub-linage or 
extended family, locally known as tokatoka, Ravuvu 1983) and the combination of 
leadership status (e.g., kin leaders) and major asset holdings (e.g., shops); in each stratum, 





fraudulence. During interviews several months after people’s application decisions, 
respondents were still unaware of the fraudulence (stage 3). In this way, I accidentally 
implemented the reactive design. This household survey with a module on one specific 
potential fraud combines advantages of the different types of surveys discussed above. In 
particular, as victims were defrauded of similar amounts of money, heterogeneity in the 
severity of victimization is very small, further sharpening the identification of 
determinants and impacts of victimization. 
As I became more aware of this recruitment agency (especially through an 
interview with its employees), my suspicion about potential fraudulence grew during the 
survey. Right after the survey was completed, news media started to report its 
fraudulence, as most applicants got neither a job nor a refund (stage 4 began). At that 
time, the agency’s director, who originated from the study region, had already left the 
country.
18
IV.  Determinants of fraud victimization  
 Unfortunately, the Fijian coup in December 2006 precluded me from 
conducting the ex post victim survey I had planned. As such, quite distinct from extant 
fraud studies on ex post victim data, I collected only ex ante victim data. 
A.  Descriptive statistics 
The empirical analysis covers 1,247 males aged between 18 and 60, who were 
eligible for the jobs offered by the recruitment agency; this sample includes 787 
households (87% of the whole sample) in all 43 sample villages (see panel A of Table 
1).
19
                                                 
18 According to news media, the director returned to Fiji in late 2009, and a police 
investigation is still in process at the time of this writing. Thus, fraud victims examined in 
this paper are not legally “fraud victims.”      
 All these eligible individuals/households are attempted victims; the fraud attempt 
was at least indirectly made on all individuals in the region, because individuals in 
villages uncovered by the recruitment drive were privately informed of the job 
opportunity (which villages in the sample were directly covered is unknown). No 
respondents had difficulty answering questions about their job applications; 238 
individuals (19% of the eligible) of 212 households (27% of households with eligible 
19 The mean monthly household pre-transfer income – including a very small amount of 
public transfers (mostly pension) – is F$1,703, or F$290 per capita. Farming accounts for 





members, or 23% of the whole sample) applied (panel B). Although 36% of households 
have more than one eligible individual, only one application was made by over 90% of 
households with an applicant(s); that is, in most cases each household selected one 
migrant laborer, indicating that migration is a collective family decision.  
In order to apply, an average applicant spent F$230 (F$1 = US$.60), and an 
average victimized household spent F$242 (close to the mean monthly per-capita 
income).
20 This amount includes application fees and all other related expenses, 
especially for transportation; to file an application, applicants travelled to the recruitment 
agency’s office in the biggest town (with a population of about 3,000) in the province, 
and many revisited to check their status (most sample villages lack phone access).
21
B.  Econometric specification 
  
Who was vulnerable to this recruitment fraud? I estimate determinants of job 
application among eligible individuals and households, using the following models:  
ihv v
1
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0 ,     (1.2) 
where i, h, and v stand for individual, household, and village, respectively; dihv and dhv, 
respectively, are a dummy variable for job application for eligible individual i and any 
eligible member of household h; ࢞࢏ࢎ࢜
૚  and ࢞࢏ࢎ࢜
૛ , respectively, are a vector of individual 
factors for individual i and household members other than individual i; ࢞ࢎ࢜
૚  and ࢞ࢎ࢜
૛ , 
respectively, are a vector of eligible and non-eligible members of household h; xhv is a 
vector of household factors; ࢞࢜
૚, and ࢞࢜
૛, respectively, are a vector of village factors 
unrelated and related to the fraudster; ׋v is unobservable village factors that determine job 
application; and eihv and ehv are residuals. Following the migration literature, potential 
migrants and other members staying home are differentiated. Equations (1.1) and (1.2) 
are estimated by a linear probability model (LPM) and probit.   
                                                 
20 Simple extrapolation suggests that approximately 1,540 individuals and 1,300 
households were victimized across the whole province, and the total loss reached over 
F$350,000, which is comparable to media reports.    
21 At the time of interviews, 80% of applicants were still waiting for the result, 10% were 
accepted, 8% were rejected, and 2% withdrew their application. None of the accepted 
applicants got the job. I repeated all regression analyses for applicants whose status was 





The selection of potential determinants follows the literature on both migration 
and crime victimization.
22 All explanatory variables are listed in Table 2, along with their 
descriptive statistics. First, individual factors capture demographics (headship and age),
23 
health (disability), education (adults’ secondary education), and employment (permanent 
wage labor).
24
Second, household factors capture demographics (female headship, age of 
household head, and the size of four cohorts) and assets (agricultural land), but not 
 Good health is an eligibility criterion for the job other than sex-age. 
Permanent employment, the opportunities for which are very limited and mostly in the 
public and tourism sectors, is considered exogenous, because individuals cannot flexibly 
adjust it (its status did not change at all after application decisions were made); dropping 
the employment variables significantly alters none of the remaining results (this is also 
true for the models discussed in Sections V and VI).  
                                                 
22 Sociologists categorize determinants of victimization into exposure, guardianship, 
attractiveness of potential targets, and proximity to potential offenders (Cohen, Kluegel, 
and Land 1981). The first three are often captured by demographic factors, police access, 
and asset/income, respectively; clear categorization is not always possible – for example, 
some measures, such as age, capture both exposure and attractiveness (e.g., Barslund et al. 
2007). Guardianship matters relatively little for fraud victimization; as police stations in 
the study area are located with close proximity to local markets, police access is captured 
by market access anyway. Proximity to potential offenders is directly captured by the 
proximity measures defined below. Extant studies of consumer fraud victimization also 
highlight the role of cognitive deficiency and social interaction/status as determinants of 
victimization (Lee and Soberon-Ferrer 1997). The former is captured by education, age, 
and health. As kin-based hierarchy plays a central role in villagers’ lives in Fiji (Turner 
1992), I added kin-status variables as covariates, finding no significant results (household 
private transfers discussed later also are neutral to kin status, Takasaki forthcoming). 
Determinants of migration include demographic factors, assets, location, and migrant 
network (e.g., Munshi 2003). Although the Fijian data lack information about a migrant 
network in the Middle East, the next section gives evidence that it plays a limited role.  
23 Some criminologists find that younger people are more likely than the elderly to be 
victimized by consumer frauds, challenging the common belief among practitioners and 
professionals that the elderly are the main victims (Titus, Heinzelmann, and Boyle 1995). 
Van Wyk and Mason (2001) attribute this to distinct socialization and risk-taking among 
different cohorts. The analysis below shows that job application is neutral to age.    
24 Some variables defined for eligible individuals (eligible household members) are not 
used for other household members (non-eligible household members), because they are 
redundant with similar household factors defined next. A potentially important individual 
factor that the present data cannot capture is military experience; however, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that such individuals are not so common in the sample. Indeed, 





income. Though income is often considered as an important determinant of crime 
victimization, it is endogenous as a determinant of job application for the following 
reasons: 1) in anticipation of labor migration and remittances, the household may adjust 
its earning efforts, and 2) any unobservable factors that determine income, such as skills, 
may also influence migration decisions (even income measured before the fraud attempt, 
which the present data lack, would be endogenous). Still, household permanent income is 
controlled for by permanent wage labor (of any household members) and land holdings, 
as well as household demographic factors.
25 Third, village factors unrelated to the 
fraudster capture market access (travel time to the closest local market), village size (total 
number of households in the village, in the population), welfare, and inequality (village 
mean and standard deviation of agricultural land in the whole sample).
26
I conjecture that two eligibility factors – sex-age and health – are significant 
determinants. Specifically, households with more eligible male adults are more likely to 
apply (endowment effect); individuals in households with more eligible members are less 
likely to apply, because others can apply (multiple applications from the same household 
are rare, as discussed above). Disabled individuals are less likely to apply. I also 
conjecture that own and other family members’ permanent employment discourages job 
application, because of the high opportunity cost of migration and its relatively low 
benefit with secure employment in the family, respectively. If victimization is associated 
with low welfare, not only permanent employment – both own and others’ – but also land 
holdings should discourage job applications. Nonsignificant results suggest that welfare 
difference within the sample does not differentiate victimization; that is, most households 
are so poor that they were potentially attracted by this job opportunity.  
  
                                                 
25 Land is communally owned by a within-village clan (locally known as mataqali, which 
consists of several tokatoka), is privately used, and by law cannot be sold (about 83% of 
the country’s total land is communal). Land holdings at the time of the fraud attempt 
should be almost the same as those at the time of interviews used here. Information about 
non-land asset holdings and shocks such as sickness (other than chronic illness captured 
by disability status) prior to the fraud attempt is lacking, however (only information about 
sickness in the past one year is available). Thus, the model cannot tell whether job 
applications responded to transitory shocks.  





Last, village factors related to the fraudster capture the physical and social 
distance between the fraudster and attempted victims. The physical distance – measured 
by villagers’ travel time to the recruitment agency’s office – determines the travel cost of 
lodging an application, as well as the agency’s recruitment drive (indeed, there were no 
applicants in six remote villages in the sample). The social distance is captured by the 
dummy for two villages in the home district of the agency’s director.
27 The director had 
built a good reputation there by offering casual labor employment and making school 
donations (he was viewed as a hero).
28
In an alternative specification, all village factors, including ׋v, are fully controlled 
for by village dummies. Similar results of the individual/household factors with village 
dummies and observable village factors, as reported next, give evidence that 
unobservable village factors are unlikely to cause bias in the latter specification. 
 I conjecture that as attempted victims become 
physically and socially closer to the fraudster, they are more likely to apply, because 
applying is less costly and they are more positive about the job (as confirmed in Section 
V). These proximity measures serve as excluded IVs in Section VI. 
C.  Estimation results 
LPM results are reported in Table 3, where robust standard errors are shown in 
the models with village dummies and standard errors are clustered by village (43 clusters) 
in the models with observable village factors (probit estimates are very similar). First, 
eligibility – sex-age and health – and proximity to the fraudster are strong determinants. 
                                                 
27 It is assumed that these two proximity measures, as well as other covariates, are 
uncorrelated with unobservable village factors ׋v. Although the recruitment drive can be 
related with such factors (the fraudster may have prior information about good targets), 
the physical distance and the director’s birthplace are not. An exception for the latter may 
be found in large cities with strong, crime-driven segregation, where future offenders 
commonly originate from certain areas. Rural Fiji is far from such a case. 
28 Two pieces of evidence strongly indicate that discounted fees were charged in the 
director’s home district. First, the mean cost for application per victimized individual – 
including transportation – in the director’s home-district villages was about half of that 
elsewhere (F$125 vs. F$263). Second, regressing the application cost on the two 
proximity variables among victimized individuals shows that it is lower in the fraudster’s 
home district by F$125 and becomes higher with greater distance (F$31 per 100% 
increase); both results are significant at least at a 1% significance level and the R squared 
is .24. The next section gives evidence that the home-district dummy captures the social 





In particular, the probability of applying for a job in the fraudster’s home district is higher 
by about 34% and a 100% increase in the travel time to the fraudster’s office lowers the 
probability by .08-.10 (no other village factors have significant effects). Second, although 
individuals in the household with a permanent wage laborer are less likely to apply (the 
results in the household-level analysis are statistically weak), neither eligible individual’s 
own employment status nor household land holdings are significant (all other factors are 
also nonsignificant). Thus, what matters is not one’s own opportunity cost of migration, 
but secure employment in the family, and households at any welfare level are vulnerable.  
V.  Reasons for fraud victimization 
A.  Descriptive statistics 
The survey asked each applicant why he applied (up to three reasons) and each 
household with no applicants why none of its eligible members applied (up to three 
reasons) (panels B and C, respectively, of Table 1).
29,30
B.  Econometric specification 
 While almost 80% of applicants 
were attracted by high salary, many households did not apply because of a concern about 
qualifications and high fees. While security mattered for 14% of non-applicant 
households, almost 20% of them questioned the contract’s authenticity; that is, about 
12% of households in the whole eligible sample took precautions to avoid victimization. 
Job type and location (abroad) were also relatively common reasons for both application 
and non-application; that is, individual job preference mattered in the opposite way. In 
contrast, alternative activities and acquaintance with someone who already had gotten the 
same job were uncommon reasons for both application and non-application, reflecting the 
small opportunity cost of migration, as found above, and a limited migrant network in the 
Middle East (in another words, the recruitment agency was the only network available).    
To examine which reasons mattered for whom, I estimate determinants of reasons 
for application among applicant individuals and reasons for non-application among non-
applicant households, using the following models:  
                                                 
29 Directly asking reasons in this manner is effective only in the ex ante victim survey; 
misreporting is most likely in the ex post victim survey. It also much better works for a 
victim survey on a specific fraud than one covering various frauds.  
30 Panel B also shows reasons for applying at the household level. Not surprisingly, the 






















































11 x Į x Į x Į x Į  if dhv = 0,     (2.2) 
where ݌௜௛௩
௝  and ݌௛௩
௝ , respectively, are a dummy for the reason j for individual i's 
application and household h’s non-application (three and six most common reasons 
discussed above are considered).
31 Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are estimated by LPM and 
probit. All explanatory variables in equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively, are the same 
as those in (1.1) and (1.2), with an exception that the fraudster’s physical distance is not 
included in ݔ௩
ଶ (which is a scalar). The analyses including the fraudster’s physical 
distance as a control show that it has no significant effects; that is, although it strongly 
determines individuals’/households’ application decisions, as found above, it does not 
affect the reasons for their decisions.
32 Excluding this variable does not significantly alter 
results of the remaining variables, either. These subsample analyses involve potential 
selection bias, because application decisions are endogenous. I estimate a selection probit 
model (Greene 2000, p.857), where the sample-selection equations for equations (2.1) 
and (2.2), respectively, are (1.1) and (1.2) with the fraudster’s physical distance as an 
excluded variable for identification. Results are very similar to the probit estimates.
33
C.  Estimation results 
  
LPM estimates with observed village factors are reported in Table 4, where 
standard errors are clustered by village (probit estimates are very similar).
34
                                                 
31 The regression analysis of reasons for applying at the household level – equation (2.2) 
for dhv = 1 – yields very similar results to the individual-level results. 
 The 
following results buttress earlier findings on determinants of job application. First, as 
making a job application is neutral to welfare level, high salary is attractive at every 
32 The nonsignificant result for high fees as a reason for non-application may seem 
counterintuitive. However, what the survey asked about is application fees unrelated to 
the physical distance, not application costs including transportation (application fees are 
separately controlled for by the fraudster’s home district dummy, as discussed above).  
33 Estimated covariance of error terms in the selection probit is not significantly different 
from zero in most cases; in the few cases where it is significant, the estimated coefficients 
are very similar to the probit results. Thus, selection bias is unlikely to be a major 
concern. 
34 In equation (2.1), the dummy for eligible individual’s disability and the dummy for 
female head are dropped, because their variations in the subsample are limited and they 





welfare level (measured by permanent wage labor and land holdings); at the same time, 
the poor do not apply because of high fees. Second, applicants in the fraudster’s home 
district are more likely to have been attracted by the job type and location than others 
were; non-applicants there are less likely to have been concerned about qualification, job 
type, and security. Thus, the fraudster’s reputation altered peoples’ perceptions about the 
prospective job, as hypothesized above.
35 Third, households with more eligible males are 
less likely to be cautious (precaution is neutral to other factors). That is, the endowment 
effect shapes victimization, partly because it alters people’s taking precautions.
36
VI.  Ex ante impacts of fraud victimization on household private transfers 
  
A.  Descriptive statistics 
Most households in the eligible sample had participated in private transfers in the 
past one month (i.e., several months after their job application decision) (see Table 5).
37
                                                 
35 The dummy for the fraudster’s home district is significant for neither high salary nor 
high fees, suggesting that it is likely to capture the social distance more strongly than 
discounted fees.  
 
Household private transfers consist of cash, inkind, and labor time; in the calculation of 
total transfers, labor time is monetized using the mean daily wage of casual labor in each 
village (it ranges from F$10 to F$20, with a median of F$15). The sample means of 
36 The following findings about people’s preferences are obtained. First, security 
concerns are stronger in a village with smaller land endowment and larger inequality. 
This indicates that land distribution shapes risk preference (when village dummies are 
used as controls, disability status, permanent employment, and the number of eligible 
males, which show significant results in Table 4, lose their statistical significance). 
Second, the job type is attractive to applicants (with small land holdings) in a small 
village, it is not attractive to non-applicants in a large village with large land holdings, 
and the job location is attractive for applicants in a small village with small land holdings. 
This suggests that village economic opportunities shape preferences for job type and 
location. Other significant results are as follows: non-applicant households with an old 
head are more likely to be concerned about qualifications; households with a disabled 
non-eligible member are more concerned about security; and high salary strongly attracts 
households with a disabled member. 
37 Respondents were asked about each major transfer received from and given to other 
households in the past month and then in the past year. Although the latter annual transfer 
data contain transfers made in part of stage 1, all of stage 2, and part of stage 3, these 
three cannot be distinguished from each other (the month when transfers were made is 
unknown). The ex ante impact analysis in this section focuses on transfers in the past 
month (stage 3). Informal loans were much less common and much smaller than gift 





monthly gross private transfers received and given are F$141 and F$104, respectively, 
the difference of which mainly comes from across-village cash and inkind transfers. 
Specifically, although most households participated in within-village transfers and the 
amounts received and given were almost balanced, across-village transfers received were 
more common and larger than those given; most across-village transfers were cash and 
inkind (exchanged through kin network Takasaki forthcoming), while labor-time 
transfers consisted of one quarter of within-village transfers. Almost all across-village 
transfers were domestic ones; distinct from smaller island states, such as Tonga, where 
overseas migrations and remittances are common (Bertram 1986), international transfers 
were negligible among Fijians in the sample.
38
B.  Econometric specification 
  
To identify how job application dhv affects household private transfers (ex ante 
impacts), I employ the following endogenous dummy variable model: 
  hv v hv hv d y H U E E        
1
v 31 hv 2
12
hv 1 x ȕ x ȕ x ȕ 1 0 ,      (3) 




v 31 hv 2
12
hv 1 x Į x Į x Į x Į 0 ,      (4) 
where yhv is the amount of net transfers received (gross transfers received minus gross 
transfers given) by household h in the past month; ࢞ࢎ࢜
૚૛ is a vector of individual factors for 
any household members summarized in Table 2; ȡv and ıv are unobservable village 
factors that determine private transfers and job application, respectively; and İhv and Ȧhv 
are residuals.
39
                                                 
38 In contrast, according to the household survey conducted in five major towns and nine 
villages in the main island Viti Levu in 2005 by the World Bank (2006a), 26% of 211 
native Fijian households had overseas migrants and 34% received overseas remittances. 
This indicates a potentially significant difference in Fijians’ transfer patterns between the 
main island and other islands and between urban and rural areas. The World Bank 
(2006a) also attributes the survey result to growing international labor migration, 
especially to the Middle East, emphasizing its importance. This paper’s finding on 
recruitment fraud highlights a significant pitfall in this development path and 
corresponding policy making.     
 For the same reasons given above, observed earned income is not 
39 This model can also estimate ex post impacts of endogenous fraud victimization. With 
a lack of ex post victim data, I cannot examine how households – both victims and non-
victims – made readjustments in their private transfers after becoming aware of the 





included as a household factor.
40
The substitution effect indicates that domestic private transfers are reduced by 
prospective remittances, i.e., negative ȕ1 (constant effect is assumed). The endogeneity of 
household application decision dhv is apparent: It is influenced by unobservable factors 
such as preference and skills in İhv that determine private transfers. Since households that 
tend to send a migrant laborer are likely to be those that rely more on private transfers, 
the OLS estimates for ȕ1 are expected to be biased upward. The identifying assumption 
for the IV estimation is that proximities to the fraudster ࢞࢜
૛ affect private transfers only 
through job application; that is, it is uncorrelated with any unobservable village factors ȡv, 
as well as unobservable household factors İhv. Moffitt (1996) clarifies the assumptions 
necessary for the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to represent a causal effect of 
an endogenous dummy variable at the individual level with an aggregate-level IV (the 
same is illustrated by Wooldridge 2002, pp. 133-134).    
 Note that ࢞ࢎ࢜
૚૛ is the only difference in equation (4) from 
(1.2). 
First, preferential treatment in the fraudster’s home district was made, not because 
of village characteristics that could be related with unobservable village factors affecting 
private transfers, but because of the place of his birth. Still, if ȡv is different between the 
fraudster’s home district and other districts in the absence of the fraud attempt, the 
exclusion restriction does not hold. With a lack of transfer data prior to the fraud attempt 
(stage 1), showing direct counterevidence against this possibility is infeasible. A piece of 
indirect counterevidence is that self-reported measures of village social problems, which 
serve as proxies for unobservable social ties determining private transfers, are not 
significantly different across the districts.
41
                                                 
40 With a lack of valid IVs, controlling for the income endogeneity is infeasible (cf. 
Jensen 2004; Juarez 2009; Kazianga 2006). In equation (3), permanent income is 
captured by a set of controls, but transitory income is not, as discussed above.  
       
41 Villagers’ social ties not only directly determine within-village transfers, but also 
indirectly influence across-village transfers; for example, weak social ties in the village 
may be associated with weak or strong household transfer networks out of the village. 
The social-problem measures are according to village leaders’ subjective assessments 
about low attendance at communal activities/ceremonies, decreasing sharing practices, 
and conflicts among households/villages (incidence was reported by 53%, 37%, and 26%, 





Next, the identifying assumption for the fraudster’s physical distance does not 
hold if the agency’s location coincides with other facilities that influence private transfers 
or other households with whom distinct across-village transfers are made. The former 
include postal offices where villagers can receive/send cash and inkind from/to cities. 
Most postal offices are located closely to local markets, the access to which is separately 
controlled for. The latter transfers exchanged with households in the town are not 
significantly different from those in other locations. The social-problem measures 
discussed above are also uncorrelated with the fraudster’s physical distance. An 
assumption that ݔ௩
ଶ is uncorrelated with İhv is supported analogously. 
I employ three specifications of 2SLS: an overidentified model with the 
fraudster’s social and physical distance as excluded IVs and just-identified models 1 and 
2 with the former and the latter, respectively, as a unique excluded IV. Although the 
over-identified model is not unbiased in small samples, the just-identified models are 
approximately median-unbiased. I also estimate the limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) estimator for the over-identified model, which is less precise than 
2SLS, but less biased (under constant effects) (e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; 
Mariano 2001). Standard errors are clustered by village (Shore-Sheppard 1996 highlights 
the importance of this cluster adjustment with an aggregate-level IV).  
Two extensions are made to further test the substitution effect. First, I compare 
gross transfers received and given. If potential donors respond to prospective remittances, 
households with an applicant should receive less gross transfers than others do.
42 Second, 
I compare within- and across-village transfers received. Since international remittances 
are the more “direct” substitute for the latter cash and inkind transfers, job application 
should reduce them more than the former.
43
                                                 
42 If households received more transfers to finance their applications several months ago, 
they are likely to have received smaller transfers in the past month, even in the absence of 
the substitution effect, and may offer larger transfers for reciprocation. Almost no 
respondents, however, reported job application as a reason for the transfers they received 
in the past year, which include those received in stage 2. Consumption and ritual (funeral, 
wedding, and other ritual events) were the most common reasons for transfers made in 
both the past month and the past year (Takasaki forthcoming).  
  
43 While an average household in the sample is a net recipient of across-village transfers, 





Distinct from gross within-village transfers received, many households are not 
recipients of across-village transfers (Table 5). I first employ 2SLS for amounts with 
many zeros. This model captures the combination of impacts on receipt and amount 
received conditional on receipt, without making any distributional assumptions (Angrist 
2001).
44
C.  Estimation results  
 Next, to identify the impact on receipt, I employ 2SLS with a dummy for receipt 
of transfers as a dependent variable in equation (3).  
The estimated coefficients (marginal effects) of job application (ȕ1) are reported 
in Table 6. Column (1) shows results for net transfers received, with no exogenous 
covariates – ࢞ࢎ࢜
૚૛, xhv, and ࢞࢜
૚. In all cases, the excluded IVs strongly determine job 
application in the first-stage equation (4) (as in equation 1.2 above). The fraudster’s 
social distance is a much stronger determinant than the physical distance (53.1 vs. 13.9 of 
F value); when these two are jointly used, the F value is 26.6 and the overidentification 
test (Hansen J statistic) does not reject a null hypothesis that they are uncorrelated with 
the error term in equation (3). Although the OLS estimates of ȕ1 are negative and small in 
magnitude with no statistical significance, the 2SLS estimates are much larger in 
magnitude with strong statistical significance in all specifications, and their point 
estimates across specifications are in a similar range; in particular, the LIML estimates 
are almost the same as the 2SLS estimates.
45
                                                                                                                                                 
transfers to households in the village is probably less costly for potential donors outside 
the village, who rely less on transfers received from them, than those in the same village.    
 When the exogenous covariates are added 
(column 2), the estimation results for ȕ1 do not significantly change (those of the 
exogenous covariates – for the OLS and the over-identified 2SLS – are reported in the 
44 Although a two-part model is commonly used in empirical works on private transfers, 
the identifying assumption does not hold in 2SLS conditional on positive (receipt), 
because excluded IVs affect participation (Angrist 2001). A tobit model relies on the 
assumption of the normally distributed error term in equation (3), against which 
counterevidence is found below. For the robustness check, I analyze not only the level of 
gross transfers received, the results of which are shown below, but also their natural log, 
finding qualitatively the same results. 
45 Table 6 also reports results of a reduced-form analysis of equation (3), where the 
endogenous variable dhv is replaced with the excluded IVs ࢞࢜
૛. Their estimated 
coefficients take the expected signs and are statistically significant (the fraudster’s 








The estimation results of gross transfers received and given strongly confirm my 
conjecture (columns 3-6). According to the 2SLS and LIML estimates, the estimated 
marginal effects of job application on gross transfers received are very close to those on 
net transfers received, and those on gross transfers given are very small and statistically 
nonsignificant;
 These results buttress the robustness of the estimated marginal effects of the 
IV regressions. Households with a job applicant receive smaller net transfers by F$139-
171 – a range comparable to the mean gross transfers received – than others do; in 
contrast, the OLS estimates ignoring victim endogeneity are strongly biased upward.  
47
The estimated marginal effects of job application on gross within- and across-
village transfers received are reported in columns (2)-(4) of Table 7.
 in contrast, only the latter results are significant in the OLS estimates.   
48 As I conjectured, 
prospective remittances more strongly reduce across-village transfers than within-village 
transfers. In particular, while results of within-village transfers lose their statistical 
significance with the exogenous covariates added (panel B), those of across-village 
transfers do not significantly change; the latter results are very similar to each other 
across specifications. The probability of receiving across-village transfers for households 
with a job applicant is almost .5 lower than others’,
49
                                                 
46 The estimated coefficients of the exogenous covariates are very similar to each other 
between the OLS and 2SLS estimates, buttressing their exogeneity (Appendix). Although 
households with a disabled member are big recipients, those with permanent employment 
and large land holdings (i.e., high permanent income) are big donors.  
 and they receive smaller amounts 
by about F$100. These results suggest that the significant reduction in total gross 
transfers received (column 1, which replicates the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6) 
47 The corresponding reduced-form results are statistically significant only for gross 
transfers received. Results of the just-identified model 2 are weak: The estimated ȕ1 
becomes much smaller with the exogenous covariates added, losing its statistical 
significance at a conventional level, and the corresponding reduced-form results are also 
statistically nonsignificant; in contrast, results of the other IV regressions are very similar 
to each other. Since these results suggest that the fraudster’s physical distance is a 
relatively weak IV, the remaining analyses exclude the just-identified model 2. 
48 In all specifications, the (joint) significance tests for excluded IV(s) show strong results 
and overidentification tests are satisfactory. 
49 The bivariate probit estimate is considerably smaller (about .3 marginal effect), 





comes mainly from the termination of receipt of across-village transfers.
50
VII.  Conclusion 
 Overall, these 
results suggest that a reduction in the private transfers that victims received during all of 
stage 3 (several months) was greater than the money they lost to apply for the job.  
Fraud studies rely on potentially underreported/misreported victim data in 
developed countries, virtually ignoring developing countries. This paper proposed 
collecting victim data before attempted victims become aware of the fraudulence (ex ante 
victim data), and examined recruitment fraud in rural Fiji. Almost one quarter of 
households were defrauded of application fees for labor migration. Although all 
households at any welfare level are vulnerable to victimization (all are poor), households 
without secure domestic employment, with more eligible members (male healthy adults), 
and with “close” proximity to the fraudster (which shapes their perceptions and benefit-
cost calculation regarding the job opportunity) are more vulnerable.  
Although defrauded money among the poor is not a large amount, the much 
bigger problem is that people’s behaviors are adversely altered by their false expectations 
induced by the fraud (ex ante impacts). In particular, recruitment-fraud victims lost 
domestic private transfers they could have received from other households outside the 
village, as a result of the substitution for prospective international remittances. This is 
one example of the potentially broad adverse effects of fraud victimization. Fraud in 
productive activities may further persistent poverty and underdevelopment (i.e., fraud-
induced poverty traps). Then, poverty alleviation as a long-run solution for victimization 
– especially through better domestic employment – is stuck. Controlling for victim 
endogeneity by using instruments – such as proximity to potential fraudsters – is crucial 
to identify fraud impacts; failing to do so gives rise to strong bias.   
Is fraud prevalent in other developing areas? As a very basic understanding is 
lacking, conventional fraud-victim data first need to be collected in developing countries. 
                                                 
50 Consider a counterfactual with no job application (victimization). The mean amount of 
gross transfers received in the whole sample would be F$48 (actual means) + 27% 
(proportion of victimized households) * F$100 = F$75. The mean amount in the case 
where only the proportion of recipients changes, with no change in the mean amount 
received among recipients, would be (F$48 / 30% (actual proportion of recipients)) * 





The recent expansion of data collection about consumer fraud (e.g., ICVS) is important, 
but misses bigger problems. Fortunately, it is straightforward to expand available victim 
surveys and household surveys with a victimization module (e.g., LSMS) to cover a 
broader range of frauds, especially in productive activities. Such ex post victim data, 
however, are most likely to incompletely or even mistakenly capture the prevalence and 
seriousness of frauds and cannot be used to identify determinants and ex ante impacts of 
fraud victimization. Ex ante victim data can be a breakthrough in fraud study and policy. 
Data collection requires a totally different approach; the passive, proactive, and reactive 
designs are all demanding and rely heavily on chance, but none of them are infeasible.  
The paper’s ex ante victim data analysis opens up new, promising avenues for 
research. The following three sets of questions about methodology, the victimization 
mechanism, and its impacts are of great importance:  
1)  What difference can ex ante victim data really make? How different would the 
paper’s empirical findings have been if ex post victim data had been analyzed?  
2)  How can the mechanism of fraud victimization, in particular, attempted victims’ 
decisions, be dissected? What policies can effectively prevent victimization? 
Structural modeling combined with ex ante victim data seems very promising. 
3)  How broadly, seriously, and persistently do fraud and fraud victimization affect 
peoples’ behaviors and welfare, before and after they become aware of the 
fraudulence? For example, does informal risk sharing work against fraud 
victimization (victims’ bad decision)? How does victimization influence subsequent 
production and investments? Does fraud cause poverty traps?  
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Table 1. Recruitment fraud victimization in rural Fiji.
Individual Household







Victimization (job application) 19% 27%
1703
(2092)










Job type 24% 24%
Abroad 16% 16%
No alternative 6% 7%
Know someone who already works 9% 8%








Do not know anyone who already works 9%
No. observations 1009 575
Notes : Individual and household sample means are shown; all 












   
Table 2. Means of explanatory variables.
Individual factors:
Household head dummy 0.50 (0.50)
Age 36.0 (12.1)
Mean age 37.6 (8.8)
Disability dummy 0.07 (0.26) 0.11 (0.31)
Adults' secondary education dummy  0.57 (0.50) 0.65 (0.48)
Permanent wage labor dummy 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.35)
Disability dummy 0.30 (0.46) 0.22 (0.42)
Adults' secondary education dummy  0.78 (0.42) 0.65 (0.48)
Permanent wage labor dummy 0.10 (0.31) 0.04 (0.20)
Disability dummy 0.29 (0.45)
Adults' secondary education dummy  0.83 (0.38)
Permanent wage labor dummy 0.17 (0.38)
Household factors (x hv):
Female head dummy 0.04 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21)
Age of household head
a 50.8 (12.9) 49.2 (13.6)
No. <18 years old 2.47 (2.07) 2.50 (1.97)
No. males 18-60 years old 2.14 (1.25) 1.58 (0.94)
No. females 18-60 years old 1.53 (0.97) 1.35 (0.85)
No. >60 years old 0.42 (0.68) 0.40 (0.68)
Agricultural land (acres) 3.21 (4.95) 2.95 (4.85)
Village factors unrelated to the fraudster (x
1
v):
Market access (min) 79.5 (66.2) 81.0 (67.3)
No. households in village 53.3 (21.6) 53.5 (21.5)
Village mean agricultural land (acres)
b
3.09 (1.81) 3.06 (1.80)
Village standard deviation of 
agricultural land (acres)
b 3.57 (3.98) 3.51 (3.94)
Village factors related to the fraudster (x
2
v):
Fraudster's home district dummy 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28)
Access to fraudster (min) 194.9 (125.8) 195.9 (127.3)
No. observations 1247 787
Notes : Standard deviations are in parentheses.
        
a No. of observations are 1244 individuals and 785 households.
        



























   
Table 3. Determinants of recruitment fraud victimization - linear probability model.








-0.076 * -0.083 * -0.134 ** -0.135 **
(0.035) (0.031) (0.049) (0.047)
0.030 0.029 0.054 0.054
(0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027)
-0.023 -0.048 -0.068 -0.100
(0.046) (0.042) (0.053) (0.054)
-0.016 -0.023 0.005 -0.004
(0.026) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
0.032 0.030 0.028 0.019
(0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.044)
-0.071 * -0.104 ** -0.060 -0.146
(0.035) (0.034) (0.074) (0.083)
Household factors:
-0.009 0.003 -0.035 -0.022
(0.054) (0.055) (0.066) (0.082)
-0.057 -0.024 -0.110 -0.066
(0.057) (0.051) (0.077) (0.079)
0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
-0.020 -0.023 0.057 ** 0.056 *
(0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.024)
0.003 0.004 0.020 0.018
(0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.027)
0.023 0.026 0.030 0.030
(0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
-0.005 -0.004 -0.015 -0.023
(0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023)









Village factors related to the fraudster:
0.340 *** 0.348 ***
(0.054) (0.081)
-0.081 ** -0.102 *
(0.029) (0.039)
Village dummies Yes No Yes No
F 6.4 *** 12.8 *** 7.1 *** 8.1 ***
R squared 0.207 0.131 0.252 0.141
No. observations 1244 1244 785 785
No. females 18-60 years old
No. >60 years old
Notes : Robust standard errors are shown in columns (1) and (3); standard errors are clustered by village in 
columns (2) and (4). Other control not shown here is constant. 
     *** Significant at 0.1 percent level.
      ** Significant at 1 percent level.
       * Significant at 5 percent level.  
Log of no. households in the 
village
Log of access to fraudster (min)
Fraudster's home district 
dummy
Log of market access (min)
Log of village mean agricultural 
land (acres)
Log of village standard deviation 
of agricultural land (acres)
Log of agricultural land (acres)
Other household members Non-eligible household members
Permanent wage labor dummy
Individual Household
Eligible individual Eligible household members
Household head dummy
Log of age
Log of mean age
Adults' secondary education 
dummy 
No. males 18-60 years old
No. <18 years old
Disability dummy




Permanent wage labor dummy






Table 4. Reasons for recruitment fraud victimization and non-victimization - linear probability model.
Salary Job type Abroad
Un-
qualified
Fees Job type Abroad Security
Pre-
caution






0.046 -0.149 0.173 0.012 -0.146 0.123
(0.103) (0.105) (0.106) (0.117) (0.096) (0.090)
0.077 0.035 -0.041 -0.031 0.149 * -0.058
(0.068) (0.078) (0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.041)
-0.047 -0.020 -0.008 -0.084 -0.039 -0.022 -0.042 0.046 0.001
(0.056) (0.044) (0.088) (0.048) (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.026) (0.037)
0.014 -0.019 -0.101 -0.047 -0.123 ** 0.020 0.120 -0.078 * 0.052
(0.098) (0.083) (0.063) (0.064) (0.044) (0.056) (0.072) (0.034) (0.048)
0.250 ** 0.006 0.170 -0.070 0.000 -0.064 -0.018 0.109 * 0.015
(0.080) (0.102) (0.089) (0.054) (0.053) (0.051) (0.056) (0.047) (0.042)
-0.006 0.005 0.027 -0.062 0.015 0.029 0.073 -0.028 -0.008
(0.049) (0.080) (0.038) (0.045) (0.048) (0.035) (0.048) (0.034) (0.036)
0.053 0.032 -0.020 -0.017 -0.014 0.052 0.054 0.005 -0.058
(0.097) (0.194) (0.091) (0.072) (0.073) (0.091) (0.104) (0.055) (0.068)
Household factors:
0.037 -0.067 0.034 -0.029 -0.019 -0.071
(0.116) (0.079) (0.108) (0.086) (0.056) (0.047)
-0.113 -0.029 -0.076 0.287 *** 0.082 -0.169 0.079 -0.034 -0.098
(0.149) (0.227) (0.182) (0.080) (0.108) (0.109) (0.075) (0.082) (0.076)
(continued)
Reasons for non-application 
among non-victimized households
Eligible individual Eligible household members
Other household members Non-eligible household members
Reasons for application among 
victimized individuals
Permanent wage labor dummy
Log of age of household head
Female head dummy





Adults' secondary education 
dummy 
Permanent wage labor dummy
Disability dummy






0.001 -0.007 -0.018 0.004 -0.014 0.026 * 0.006 -0.017 0.007
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.015 0.011 -0.015 -0.027 -0.020 0.002 -0.005 -0.026 * -0.051 *
(0.024) (0.035) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.011) (0.019)
0.019 0.014 0.002 -0.031 0.026 0.014 -0.023 0.012 0.019
(0.017) (0.035) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030)
0.010 -0.048 -0.045 0.043 0.028 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011
(0.063) (0.065) (0.052) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028)
-0.023 -0.111 * 0.018 -0.049 -0.099 ** 0.007 0.028 -0.019 0.033
(0.049) (0.054) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.041) (0.024) (0.033)
Village factors unrelated to the fraudster:
-0.031 -0.040 0.014 -0.004 -0.019 -0.001 0.002 0.012 0.000
(0.030) (0.032) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
0.014 -0.191 ** -0.133 * 0.006 -0.018 0.140 * -0.017 -0.056 -0.025
(0.089) (0.069) (0.061) (0.048) (0.057) (0.065) (0.047) (0.047) (0.040)
0.011 -0.223 -0.519 *** 0.167 0.168 0.472 * 0.022 -0.288 -0.140
(0.415) (0.282) (0.139) (0.150) (0.147) (0.214) (0.128) (0.158) (0.119)
0.191 0.072 0.193 * -0.079 -0.073 -0.247 0.000 0.221 * -0.009
(0.278) (0.188) (0.091) (0.093) (0.100) (0.143) (0.079) (0.101) (0.072)
Village factors related to the fraudster:
-0.181 0.168 ** 0.093 ** -0.200 ** -0.056 -0.122 * -0.050 -0.120 * -0.023
(0.137) (0.055) (0.026) (0.057) (0.049) (0.057) (0.035) (0.045) (0.069)
F 7.9 *** 6.6 *** 10.1 *** 6.9 *** 2.4 ** 2.7 ** 1.3 4.6 *** 2.3 *
R squared 0.187 0.117 0.121 0.084 0.045 0.059 0.018 0.087 0.051
No. observations 238 238 238 621 621 621 621 621 621
Notes : Standard errors are clustered by village. Other control not shown here is constant.
    *** Significant at 0.1 percent level.
     ** Significant at 1 percent level.
      * Significant at 5 percent level.  
Log of market access (min)
Log of village mean agricultural 
land (acres)
Log of no. households in the 
village
Fraudster's home district 
dummy
Log of agricultural land (acres)
No. >60 years old
No. <18 years old
Log of village standard 
deviation of agricultural land 
No. males 18-60 years old






   





All (F$) 92% 141 (183) 88% 104 (141)
Same village 89% 93 (126) 87% 89 (117)
Other village or city 30% 48 (121) 15% 15 (58)
Cash and inkind (F$) 92% 114 (160) 88% 78 (118)
Same village 89% 70 (105) 87% 66 (94)
Other village or city 30% 44 (112) 15% 12 (52)
Labor (man-day) 25% 1.9 (4.8) 26% 1.7 (4.3)
Same village 24% 1.6 (4.2) 25% 1.5 (4.0)







Notes : These are transfers in the past one month. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 






Table 6. Estimated marginal effects of recruitment fraud victimization on household private transfers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraud victimization dummy:
-19.4 -14.7 14.1 24.6 33.9 * 39.4 **
(15.9) (16.4) (19.6) (20.8) (14.9) (12.7)
-152.7 ** -158.1 *** -180.1 *** -141.4 *** -26.4 17.6
(59.1) (36.0) (45.0) (37.1) (65.0) (34.5)
-162.8 ** -171.6 *** -145.6 *** -144.6 *** 17.6 27.4
(74.5) (39.9) (26.1) (29.1) (86.1) (36.3)
-136.9 * -138.5 * -233.9 * -136.9 -95.5 3.3
(64.5) (58.3) (99.2) (87.6) (77.9) (60.3)
-152.9 ** -158.5 *** -183.1 *** -141.5 *** -29.6 17.5
(59.2) (36.1) (46.3) (37.1) (68.2) (34.6)
2SLS - over-identified model:
0.37 *** 0.34 ***
(0.07) (0.08)
-0.10 ** -0.10 *
(0.03) (0.04)
Excluded IVs: F
a 26.6 *** 28.6 ***
0.12 0.24 0.94 0.01 1.75 0.15
-62.0 ** -62.3 *** -44.5 * -50.0 ** 17.6 12.3
(22.9) (13.1) (19.8) (18.1) (39.2) (17.2)
12.2 12.4 26.3 * 13.6 13.9 1.0
(7.1) (7.5) (10.8) (11.9) (8.5) (9.4)
2SLS - just-identified model 1:
0.43 *** 0.42 ***
(0.06) (0.05)
Excluded IV: F
a 53.1 *** 69.1 ***
-70.7 ** -72.1 *** -63.3 *** -60.8 *** 7.6 11.5
(24.1) (11.7) (16.1) (11.5) (36.9) (14.9)
2SLS - just-identified model 2:
-0.13 *** -0.14 ***
(0.03) (0.04)
Excluded IV: F
a 13.9 *** 12.4 ***
17.7 * 19.6 * 30.3 ** 19.4 12.3 -0.5
(8.7) (8.3) (10.8) (10.9) (8.9) (8.8)
Exogenous covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes





2SLS - overidentified model
Notes : Fraudster’s home district dummy and log of access to fraudster are excluded IVs in over-identified model; 
fraudster’s home district dummy is an excluded IV in just-identified model 1; and log of access to fraudster is an 
excluded IV in just-identified model 2. Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. Exogenous 
covariates in columns (2), (4), and (6) are those shown in appendix. 
    *** Significant at 0.1 percent level.
     ** Significant at 1 percent level.
      * Significant at 5 percent level.  
      
a Results in columns (3) and (5), respectively, are almost and exactly the same as those in (1); results in (4) 
         and (6), respectively, are almost and exactly the same as those in (2).
Reduced-form: Log of access 
to fraudster (min)
First stage: Fraudster's home 
district dummy
a





First stage: Fraudster's home 
district dummy
a




First stage: Log of access to 
fraudster (min)
a
2SLS - just-identified model 1
2SLS - just-identified model 2
LIML - overidentified model
Overidentification test: 
Hansen J






(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Models with no exogenous covariates
14.1 7.7 5.8 -0.01
(19.6) (12.6) (11.2) (0.04)
-180.1 *** -57.3 * -117.3 *** -0.48 ***
(45.0) (22.8) (29.3) (0.10)
-145.6 *** -49.7 ** -94.0 *** -0.49 ***
(26.1) (18.2) (13.5) (0.07)
-183.1 *** -57.4 * -119.3 *** -0.48 ***
(46.3) (22.8) (30.2) (0.10)
-0.33 ***
(0.05)
No. observations 772 777 784 784
B. Models with exogenous covariates
24.6 13.3 10.4 0.00
(20.8) (13.2) (12.0) (0.04)
-141.4 *** -31.3 -103.6 *** -0.45 ***
(37.1) (22.7) (23.7) (0.10)
-144.6 *** -41.1 * -97.7 *** -0.52 ***
(29.1) (20.5) (18.1) (0.09)
-141.5 *** -31.4 -103.8 *** -0.45 ***
(37.1) (22.8) (23.8) (0.10)
-0.31 ***
(0.07)




Table 7. Estimated marginal effects of recruitment fraud victimization on household 





2SLS - over-identified model
2SLS - just-identified model 1
LIML - over-identified model
OLS
Notes : Fraudster’s home district dummy and log of access to fraudster are excluded IVs in over-
identified model and excluded variables in the transfer-receipt equation in the bivariate probit; and 
fraudster’s home district dummy is an excluded IV in just-identified model 1. Standard errors 
clustered by village are in parentheses. Exogenous covariates are those shwon in appendix. 
Results in column (1) is the same as those in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. 
     *** Significant at 0.1 percent level.
      ** Significant at 1 percent level.
       * Significant at 5 percent level.  
2SLS - over-identified model
2SLS - just-identified model 1
LIML - over-identified model
Bivariate probit (at means)






Appendix. Determinants of household private transfers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-14.7 24.6 39.4 ** -158.1 ** -141.4 *** 17.6
(16.4) (20.8) (12.7) (36.0) (37.1) (34.5)
Individual factors (any household members):
48.3 ** 43.2 * -5.1 36.2 * 29.2 -6.9
(14.3) (16.7) (13.5) (14.1) (18.2) (13.5)
2.7 13.1 10.1 12.8 24.7 11.6
(11.4) (15.6) (11.6) (11.2) (17.9) (12.4)
-3.4 40.4 42.7 ** -23.0 17.5 39.7 **
(14.8) (22.3) (13.8) (16.7) (23.6) (14.5)
Household factors:
38.2 28.9 -9.5 35.2 25.3 -9.9
(36.3) (32.8) (26.0) (43.5) (39.3) (24.6)
12.0 6.7 -3.6 4.3 -1.9 -4.8
(27.3) (28.1) (29.9) (29.9) (32.9) (30.0)
-0.3 1.7 2.1 -0.2 1.8 2.1
(2.7) (2.7) (2.0) (2.7) (2.7) (1.9)
-9.1 -5.2 3.8 -1.5 3.6 5.0
(7.7) (7.7) (7.1) (8.3) (9.2) (7.4)
-6.0 -7.1 -0.8 -3.3 -4.0 -0.4
(7.4) (5.6) (6.3) (8.7) (7.5) (6.0)
-12.1 3.6 15.5 -2.6 14.5 16.9
(13.8) (9.7) (9.9) (14.6) (11.1) (9.3)
-13.1 10.0 23.3 * -15.7 7.0 22.9 *
(11.8) (11.7) (9.2) (10.9) (12.4) (9.6)
Village factors:
1.3 1.3 -0.1 1.3 1.2 -0.1
(2.9) (6.4) (4.5) (4.4) (8.2) (4.6)
19.8 14.6 -5.7 25.2 20.8 -4.8
(18.2) (24.7) (12.4) (15.5) (21.5) (12.2)
63.3 182.5 * 118.7 * 18.1 130.0 111.8 *
(54.2) (82.2) (46.7) (52.3) (82.0) (49.7)
-49.9 -96.7 * -46.6 -25.7 -68.7 -42.9
(32.9) (47.8) (27.1) (30.7) (46.7) (28.5)
F 3.4 *** 2.1 * 4.8 *** 4.1 *** 3.0 * 6.4 ***
R squared 0.032 0.044 0.076
No. observations 769 770 769 769 770 769























Adults' secondary education 
dummy 
Permanent wage labor dummy
Female head dummy
Log of no. households in the 
village
Log of village mean agricultural 
land (acres)
Log of village standard deviation 
of agricultural land (acres)
Notes : Standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. Other control not shown here is constant. 
     *** Significant at 0.1 percent level.
      ** Significant at 1 percent level.
       * Significant at 5 percent level.  
       
a The endogenous variable in 2SLS;  fraudster's district dummy and log of fraudster's access are excluded IVs. 
          The results in columns (1) and (4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) are the same as those in columns (2), (4), 
          and (5), respectively, of Table 6.
No. <18 years old
No. males 18-60 years old
No. females 18-60 years old
No. >60 years old
Log of agricultural land (acres)
Log of market access (min)